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NOTE
Trial by Jury Under the Seventh Amendment
During this war for freedom it is both natural and fitting that questions
respecting civil liberties should engage the attention of ihe Supreme Court
of the United States, particularly questions respecting freedom of speech
and worship. Yet the notoriety attending decisions on these freedoms is
likely to obscure the consideration that the court has of late been giving to
another guarantee of the Bill of Rights-the right of trial by jury.
It is noteworthy that, though the Seventh Amendment secured the
right to trial by jury in 1791, the most significant interpretations of the
Amendment are contemporary, or nearly so. Of course, constitutional
questions would not be expected to arise as long as the procedures of 1791
were retained, and since procedural change has been slow many questions
concerning the Amendment are understandably of recent origin. It is
remarkable, however, that some of the procedures questioned nowadays for
the first time are of long established standing.
The cases referred to in the preceding statements are Slocum v. New
York Life Insurance Co.,1 decided in 1913; Baltimore & Carolina Line,
Inc., v. Redman 2 and Dimnick v. Schidt,8 both decided in 1935; and
Galloway v. United States,4 decided in 1943. They differ widely in many
respects, but all deal with the common problem of the scope of trial by jury
in the federal courts. Together they represent the current trend of decisions on that basic matter.
The Slocum case was an action brought on a life insurance policy in
the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. At the conclusion of the evidence defendant requested the court to direct a verdict in
its favor, which the court declined to do. After the jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff, defendant moved for judgment in its favor on the evidence
notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was denied and judgment was
entered for the plaintiff. The case was taken on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals, where error was assigned on the refusal to direct a
verdict and on the denial of the motion for judgment n. o. v. That court
reversed the judgment, with a direction to sustain the latter motion on the
ground that the evidence did not legally admit of the conclusion that the
policy was a subsisting contract at the time of the insured's death. A writ
of certioraribrought the case to the Supreme Court. There it was held
that although the evidence did not admit of the conclusion that the policy
was in force when the insured died, and although the Circuit Court should
have directed a verdict for defendant, nevertheless the Circuit Court of
Appeals was in error in ordering a judgment for defendant n. o. v. The
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was accordingly modified by
eliminating the direction to enter judgment and by substituting a direction
for a new trial.

Mr. justice Van Devanter, speaking for a majority of the court, called

attention to the provision of the Seventh Amendment that "no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise reExamined in any Court of the United States,
U. S. 364 (1913).
2. 295 U. S. 654 (1935).
3. 293 U. S. 474 (1935).
4. 63 Sup. Ct. 1077 (I943).
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than according to the rules of the common law", 5 and, as regards those rules
he quoted as follows from a decision by Mr. Justice Story in 1830: "The
only modes known to the common law to re-examine such facts, are the
granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, to which the
record was properly returnable, or the award of a venire facias de novo, by
an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings." 6 Hence he held that the verdict in plaintiff's favor, although erroneously allowed, "operated, under the Constitution, to prevent a re-examination of the issues save on a new trial."
Furthermore, he offered an explanation of the common law practices
of motion in arrest of judgment, motion for judgment n. o. v. and demurrer
to the evidence to show that in these practices there was nothing inconsistent with Mr. Justice Story's statement. He pointed out that the first two
motions did not involve a re-examination of facts determined by the jury,
because they were granted solely on the basis of defects in the pleadings.
As to the demurrer to the evidence, he said: "there was nothing in the
nature or operation of the demurrer to evidence at common law which has
any tendency to show that issues of fact tried by a jury could be reexamined
otherwise than on a new trial." s
Mr. Justice Hughes spoke for the four Justices who dissented. After
cautioning that the Seventh Amendment "deals with matters of substance
and not with mere matters of form", he asserted that the decision of the
majority resulted from "a failure to regard the full scope and import of
common law procedure". 9 He cited Chinoweth v. Lessee of Haskell," a
former decision of the Supreme Court, to show "that the practice in the
present case did not differ in its essential features from that permitted at
common law"."l In that case defendant demurred to plaintiff's evidence.
The trial court reserved decision on the demurrer and the jury found a
verdict for plaintiff subject to the court's opinion on the demurrer. The
court then overruled the demurrer and entered judgment for plaintiff on
the verdict. The Supreme Court, reviewing the evidence, found that the
demurrer ought to have been sustained, and therefore reversed the judgment for plaintiff and remanded to the district court with directions to
enter judgment in favor of defendant. "Here then", said Mr. Justice
Hughes, "is a case, in this court, which contradicts the conclusion that there
is no permissible practice under the Constitution by which, when a verdict
has been taken for the plaintiff and it has been found . . .that there is no
legal basis for it in the evidence, judgment can be directed for the defendant". 12 He concluded that "all that has been done in the present case could,
in substance, have been done at common law, albeit by a more cumbrous
method." 1s
Mr. Justice Hughes did not expressly point out that the trial judge in
the Slocum case had not reserved his decision on the motion for directed
verdict, and that in this respect what was done differed from the common
law practice referred to. This difference he evidently waived aside as a
trifle of no significance. He was convinced that a plaintiff whose verdict
5. At 376.
6. At 378.
7. At 398.
0. At 392.

9.At 408.
i0.3 Pet. 92 (283O).
i.At 416.
12. At 416-417.
13. At 428.
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is not sustainable by the evidence was not entitled to a new trial at common
law and should be entitled to none today. No mere differences of procedural detail could alter that basic conviction.
The views of Mr. Justice Hughes were partially vindicated by the case
of Baltimore & CarolinaLine, Inc. v. Redman, 4 which was decided by a
unanimous court in 1935. This was an action for alleged negligent injury
in a federal court in New York. At the conclusion of the evidence the
defendant moved for a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff.
The court, reserving decision on the motion, submitted the case to the jury
subject to its opinion on the question reserved. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court then overruled the defendant's motion
for dismissal and entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. The
Circuit Court of Appeals held the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdict, reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, declining the defendant's request that the direction be for a dismissal of the complaint. The
Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certiorari,and modified
the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals by substituting a direction
for a judgment of dismissal on the merits in place of the direction for a new
trial. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who wrote the majority opinion in the
Slocum case, spoke for the court. "In [the Slocum] case", he said, "the
defendant's request for a directed verdict was denied without any reservation of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence", whereas in the present case "the trial court expressly reserved its ruling".' 5 "At common
law", he continued, "there was a well established practice of reserving
questions of law arising during trials by jury and of taking verdicts subject
to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved", 6 which "undoubtedly was
well established when the Seventh Amendment was adopted and therefore
must be regarded as part of the common law rules to which resort must be
had in testing and measuring the right of trial by jury as preserved and
protected by that Amendment".1? Then he referred as follows to the
Chinoweth case 18 on which Mr. Justice Hughes had placed capital reliance
in dissenting in the Slocum case, and which he himself had overlooked in
the majority opinion in that case: "This Court has distinctly recognized
that a federal court may take a verdict subject to the opinion of the court
on a question of law, and in one case where a verdict for the plaintiff was
thus taken has reversed the judgment given on the verdict and directed a
judgment for the defendant." 19 Finally, he remarked of the Slocum case:
"It is true that some parts of the opinion in that case give color to the interpretation put on it by the court of appeals. In this they go beyond the case
then under consideration and are not controlling. Not only so, but they
must be regarded as qualified by what is said in this opinion." 20
Thus while some of the generalizations in the Slocum opinion are
repudiated the ruling in that case is adhered to. This means that, under
the Slocum case, the plaintiff who receives a verdict after defendant's motion
for directed verdict is wrongfully denied still has the right to a new trial;
but, under the Redmun case, if he receives the verdict before defendant's
motion is ruled upon-the court having reserved decision thereon-the
14. Supra note 2.

15. At 658.
i6. At 659.
17. At 66o.
18. Supra note io.

ig. At 66o-66i.

2o. At
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right is denied and defendant is entitled to judgment. 2 1 The ancient practice of reserving ruling is thus made the basis for a distinction which creates
in the one case a constitutional right to another trial that is denied in the
other. However, the right created is obviously insubstantial if its existence
depends upon the adventitious circumstance that the ruling on defendant's
motion for a directed verdict is deferred. When the court seizes upon this
fortuity as the basis for refusing the "right" it makes the initial recognition
of the "right" indefensible. Acknowledgment of the errors in the opinion
in the Slocum case called for the overruling of that case. 22
Although the Slocum case was not overruled, its significance was
restricted. A few years later when the Supreme Court promulgated the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the case was completely nullified. Rule
50 (b) provided that "Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at
the close of all the evidence is denied . . . the court is deemed to have

submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal
questions raised by the motion." Thus after more than a score of years
the fundamental error of the Slocum case in misinterpreting common law
practice3 was corrected by resort to the venerable common law device of a
2
fiction.
The case of Dimick v. Schiedt2 4 was decided a few months earlier than
the Baltimore & CarolinaLine case and also dealt with the plaintiff's right
to a new trial. This was an action for damages for personal injuries, instituted in the federal district court in Massachusetts. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff for $5oo. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on
the ground inter alia that the damages were inadequate. The trial court
ordered a new trial on this ground, unless the defendant would file a stipulation consenting to increase the damages to $I,5oo. Plaintiff's consent was
neither required nor given, but defendant did consent. A denial of the
motion for a new trial followed automatically, and judgment was entered
for plaintiff for $I,5OO. On plaintiff's appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals
a divided court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings on the ground that plaintiff's rights under the Seventh Amendment had been violated. The Supreme Court granted certiorariand by a
vote of 5 to 4 affirmed the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
21. Cf. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301

U. S. 389 (937).
For criticisms of the Slocum case see the following:

THORNDIKE , Trial by
Jury in United States Courts (913) 26 HARV. L. REv. 732; THAYER, Judicial AdMinistration (1915) 63 U. OF PA. L. REy. 585; (1913) 38 A. B. A. REP. 561; SCOTT,
Trial by Jury and the Reformr of Civil Procedure (1918) 3 HARV. L. REV. 669, 688.
Cf. SCHOFIELD, New Trials and the Seventh Antendinent--Slocum v. New York Life
Insurance Co. (1913) 8 ILL. L. REV. 287, 381, 465.
23. Cf. the suggestion of Thorndike: "The decision of the majority of the court
is a public misfortune, because it destroys a simple means of enforcing, without the
expense, delay, and uncertainty of a new trial, a right to which the decision shows
that a party was entitled at the trial. There is, however, a way in which the consequences of the decision may be mitigated. The Pennsylvania statute provides only
for recording the evidence, when the Judge is asked to direct a verdict. If some
words were added authorizing also the recording of such alternative or other findings as the judge may think proper to take, then the court on a subsequent motion
or on appeal could enter the proper judgment on the alternative finding. For example, in the case just decided, the judge might have directed the jury, if they gave
a verdict for the plaintiff, to give also an alternative verdict for the defendant if the
court should be of opinion that the evidence did not justify a verdict for the plaintiff. The alternative verdict would be as good as if it had been the only verdict,
and nobody could say that the Constitution was infringed by entering judgment upon
it. This may seem a mere form, but, if the decision is right, it is a matter of sub22.

stance."

THORNDIKE,

24. Supra note 3.

op. cit. supra note

22

at 737.
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Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, asserted that "the
established practice and the rule of the common law, as it existed in England
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase
the amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions such as that here under
consideration". 2 5 He the4 dealt with the contention "that our federal
courts from a very early day have upheld the authority of a trial court to
deny a motion for new trial because damages were found to be excessive,
if plaintiff would consent to remit the excessive amount, and that this holding requires us to recognize a similar rule in respect of increasing damages
found to be grossly inadequate".2 6 He contended that this practice of
remittitur "has been condemned as opposed to the principles of the common
law by every reasoned English decision, both before and after the adoption
of the Federal Constitution" and added that "it, therefore, may be that if
the question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would be
decided otherwise". "But", he concluded, "the doctrine has been accepted
as the law for more than a hundred years and uniformly applied in the federal courts during that time. And, as it finds some support in the practice of
the English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution, we may assume
that in a case involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine
would not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day". 27 Furthermore, he
emphasized the following difference between the practice of remittitur and
actditur: 28 "Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a
remission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible support in
the view that what remains is included in the verdict along with the unlawful excess-in that sense that it has been found by the jury-and that the
remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an excrescence. But where
the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is a bald addition of
29 something which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict".
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Stone took issue with the majority's contention that the common law rule in I79I forbade additur. He observed that
"in no recorded case does it appear that any English judge had considered
the possibility of denying a new trial where the defendant had consented to
increase the amount of recovery." 80 This negative evidence, he thought,
points not to the existence of a positive rule forbidding additur, but rather
to the conclusion that there was no common law rule on the subject at all.
Next, he drew a forceful comparison between the Seventh Amendment and
the Judiciary Act of 1789. That Act, he pointed out, adopted the common
law rules of evidence for criminal trials in federal courts, but, because one
of the principles thus adopted was "the adaptability of the common law to
every new situation to which it might be needful to apply it", the court
had held that the rules to be applied "are not the particular rules which
were in force in I79I, but are those rules adopted to present day conditions".31 Then he continued as follows: "The common law is not one
system when it, or some part of it, is adopted by the Judiciary Act, and
another if it is taken over by the Seventh Amendment. If this Court could
thus, in conformity to common law, substitute a new rule for an old one
At 482.
26. Ibid.
27. At 484-485.
28. This term seems to have been coined by Morton, J. dissenting in the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Schiedt v. Dimick, 7o F. (2d) 558, 563 (C. C. A. ist, 1934).
25.

29.

At. 486.

30. At 495.
31. At 496.
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because it was more consonant with modem conditions, it would seem that
no violence would be done to the common law by extending the principle
of the remittitur to the case where the verdict is inadequate, although the
common law had made no rule on the subject in 1791." 32
Of course, he recognized that the Seventh Amendment imposes limits
on such extensions of the common law. Previously he had pointed out
that while the Amendment was not "intended to perpetuate in changeless
form the ininutiae of trial practice as it existed in the English courts in
1791" its purpose was "to preserve the essentials of the jury trial as it was
known to the common law before the adoption of the Constitution".2 3
Accordingly, he argued that recognition of additur would not alter the
essentials of common law trial by jury. In this connection he noticed that
at common law the motion for new trial was not made before the trial judge
but before the court en ban, and there was no appellate review of the ruling
granting or denying the motion. Hence he said of the instant case: "A
denial of the motion out of hand, however inadequate the verdict, was not
an encroachment upon the province of the jury as the common law defined
it. It would seem not to be any the more so here because the exercise of
the judge's discretion was affected by his knowledge of the fact that a proper
recovery had been assured to the plaintiff by the consent of the defendant.
Thus the plaintiff has suffered no infringement of a right by the denial of
his motion. The defendant has suffered none because he has consented to
the increased recovery, of which he does not complain." 84
Fundamental similarities between the Dimick and Slocum cases are
not far to seek. In each the plaintiff is basing the claim to a new trial on
the contention that the common law gave him the right and that the Seventh
Amendment makes the common law rule immutable. Each case therefore
requires a painstaking examination of the details, often obscure, of what5
Mr. Justice Stone calls "the legal scrap heap of a century and a half ago".
In each case to grant the plaintiff's contention will prevent the operation
of procedural reforms designed to mitigate the burden of new trials on the
courts. The plaintiff wins, not, however, without the vigorous protest of
four dissenting justices that the majority misconstrue the common law to
create rights unknown to that system and then impose the system thus
erroneously altered as a barrier to much needed procedural reforms. The
outstanding difference between the two cases is, of course, that a way was
found around the restrictions of the Slocum case, whereas no escape from
the Dimick case, short of overruling it, is yet apparent.
In the Slocum and Baltimore & CarolinaLine cases no question was
raised as to the propriety under the Seventh Amendment of defendant's
motion for directed verdict. Indeed, one would scarcely expect such a
question to be raised, for since 1850 the .Supreme Court has been passing
upon rulings on motion for directed verdict without suggesting any doubt
as to the validity of the practice. 86 Nevertheless in Galloway v. United
States,3 7 decided in 1943, that very question was raised and decided. Plaintiff, against whom the verdict had been directed below, predicated his argument on features of the common law demurrer to the evidence and motion
32.

Ibid.

33. At 490.
34. At 492-493.

35. At 495.
36. See HACKETT, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the Right to Direct
a Verdict (1914) 24 YALE L. J. 127; and Galloway v. United States, 63 Sup. Ct.
,077, io86 fn. i9, 1093 (1943).
37. Supra note 4.
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for new trial, which, of course, were the classical modes of challenging the
sufficiency in law of plaintiff's evidence. His argument, as summarized by
the court, was "that the directed verdict as now administered differs from
both those procedures because, on the one hand, allegedly higher standards
of proof are required and, on the other, different consequences follow as to
further maintenance of the litigation. . . . that in 1791, a litigant could
challenge his opponent's evidence, either by the demurrer, which when
determined ended the litigation, or by motion for a new trial which if successful, gave the adversary another chance to prove his case; and therefore
the Amendment excluded any challenge to which one or the other of these
consequences does not attach". 88
The argument was ingenious and adroit analysis was required to
answer it. This was supplied in one brilliant paragraph by Mr. Justice
Rutledge, speaking as follows for the majority: "It may be doubted that
the Amendment requires challenge to an opponent's case to be made without reference to the merits of one's own and at the price of all opportunity
to have it considered. On the other hand, there is equal room for disbelieving it compels endless repetition of litigation and unlimited chance, by
education gained at the opposing party's expense, for perfecting a case at
other trials. The essential inconsistency of these alternatives would seem
sufficient to refute that either or both, to the exclusion of all others, received
constitutional sanctity by the Amendment's force. The first alternative,
drawn from the demurrer to the evidence, attributes to the Amendment the
effect of forcing one admision because another and an entirely different one
is made, and thereby compels conclusion of the litigation once and for all.
The true effect of imposing such a risk would not be to guarantee the plaintiff a jury trial. It would be rather to deprive the defendant (or the plaintiff if he were the challenger) of that right; or, if not that, then of the right
to challenge the legal sufficiency of the opposing case. The Amendment
was not framed or adopted to deprive either party of either right. It is
impartial in its guaranty of both. To posit assertion of one upon sacrifice
of the other would dilute and distort the full protection intended. The
admitted validity of the practice on the motion for a new trial goes far to
demonstrate this. It negatives any idea that the challenge must be made
at such a risk as the demurrer imposed. As for the other alternative, it is
not urged that the Amendment guarantees another trial whenever challenge
to the sufficiency of evidence is sustained . . .. That argument, in turn,
is precluded by the practice on demurrer to the evidence." 3 9 As to the
objection that a higher standard of proof is required to avoid a directed
verdict than to defeat a demurrer to the evidence, Mr. Justice Rutledge had
the following to say: "It hardly affords help to insist upon 'substantial evidence' rather than 'some evidence' or 'any evidence', or vice versa. The
matter is essentially one to be worked out in particular situations and for
particular types of cases. Whatever may be the general formulation, the
essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for
probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked. The mere difference in
labels used to describe this standard, Whether it is applied under the demurrer to the evidence or on motion for a directed verdict, cannot amount
to a departure from 'the rules
of the common law' which the Amendment
40
requires to be followed."
38. At io87.
39. At ioSS-io89.
4o. At io89-io9o.
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The majority voted to approve the directed verdict for defendant. Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for the three Justices who dissented, thought that
the plaintiff had made a case for the jury. He also made some interesting
observations on the Seventh Amendment. He referred to the decision of
the majority as marking "a continuation of the gradual process of judicial
erosion which in one hundred fifty years has slowly worn away a major
portion of the essential guarantee" 41 of the Amendment. He quoted 41
with apparent approval the statement on which Mr. Justice Van Devanter
relied in the Slocum case and later repudiated in the Baltimore & Carolina
Line case; 43 namely, that "the only modes known to the common law to
re-examine .

.

. facts [found by the jury], are the granting of a new

trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the record was
properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings." He
referred with apparent disapproval to the power of federal judges to comment to the jury on the evidence,"4 to the remittitur practice, 45 and to the
practice of directing verdicts, all as episodes in a story which "depicts the
constriction of a constitutional civil right".46 He assumed without deciding "that the adoption of the Seventh Amendment was meant to have no
limiting effect on the contemporary demurrer to evidence practice", 47 but
denounced the invention of the directed verdict as "a long step toward the
determination of fact by judges instead of by juries". 48

"This new de-

vice", he said, "contained potentialities for judicial control of the jury
which had not existed in the demurrer to the evidence", 49 because, he said:
"In the first place, demurring to the evidence was risky business; . . .
upon joinder in demurrer the case was withdrawn from the jury while
the court proceeded to give final judgment either for or against the de-"
murrant. Imposition of this risk was no mere technicality; for by making
withdrawal of a case from the jury dangerous to the moving litigant's
cause, the early law went far to assure that facts would never be examined
except by a jury. Under the directed verdict practice the moving party
takes no such chance, for if his motion is denied, instead of suffering a
directed verdict against him, his case merely continues into the hands of
the jury .

.

. In the second place, under the directed verdict practice

the courts, . . . permitted directed verdicts even though there was far
more evidence in the case than a plaintiff would have needed to withstand a demurrer." 50 In support of the second statement the Justice referred to "the traditional rule that juries might pass finally on facts if there
was 'any evidence' to support a party's contention". He said that this
"rule was given an ugly name, 'the scintilla rule', to hasten its demise",
and this demise was brought about when "the Court declared that 'some'
evidence was not enough-there must be evidence sufficiently persuasive
to the judge so that he thinks 'a jury can properly5 2proceed'." 51 This latter
rule was dubbed the "substantial evidence rule".
41. At iogo.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
5o.
5i.
52.

At

1092.
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At io92.
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At 2o95.
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The Justice apparently thought that the scintilla rule was applied on
demurrer to the evidence and the "substantial evidence rule" on directed
verdict, and hence "under the directed verdict practice the courts permitted directed verdicts even though there was far more evidence in the
case than a' plaintiff would have needed to withstand a demurrer". This
is believed to be an erroneous impression. Classically, the substantial evidence rule was applied in cases of a demurrer. It was settled that a demurrer to the evidence admits only "whatever the jury may reasonably
infer from the evidence". 8 Thus, to defeat a demurrer "some" evidence
was not enough. There must be evidence sufficiently persuasive to the
judge so that he thinks a jury can reasonably infer the truth of plaintiff's
contentions. The scintilla rule was therefore not the creature of the common law demurrer to the evidence and the suggestion that it should have
been retained because of the Seventh Amendment is misleading.
In concluding his general observations Mr. Justice Black admonished
that "the call for the true application of the Seventh Amendment is not to
words, but to the spirit of honest desire to see that Constitutional right
preserved". 5' Nevertheless he offered his own verbal formulation as follows: "As for myself, I believe that a verdict should be directed, if at all,
only when, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is in
the evidence no room whatever for honest difference of opinion over the
factual issue in controversy." 55 The only material difference between
this and the statement of the majority that "the esential requirement is
that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts after
making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the
party whose case is attacked"56 is that the majority omits the prohibition
against weighing the credibility of witnesses. Nevertheless the plaintiff
has no ground for complaint on this score, for Mr. Justice Rutledge concludes by saying: "We hardly need add that we give full credence to all
of the testimony." 57
It should be observed, however, that in the case under discussion the
directed verdict was against the party carrying the burden of proof; and
since that party's witnesses were believed by the court, and the other party
was seeking the ruling of the court, no question was raised as to the court's
usurping the functions of the jury by weighing the credibility of the witnesses. An entirely different situation is presented when the directed
verdict is for the party carrying the burden. The other party is then no
longer seeking the ruling of the court and may plausibly object that the
court, rather than the jury, is passing upon the credibility of his adversary's witnesses. In this situation the difference between the formulations
for the majority and dissent would become material. 58
Cases like those under consideration do not lend themselves to summary by way of generalization. Nevertheless it may be said that perhaps
the most striking characteristic common to all of them is the extent to which
they give a practical application to legal history. What is generally con53. Fowle v. Alexandria,

ii

Wheat

320, 323

(1826).

54. At xo95-io96.
55. At io96.
56. At xo8g.
57. At iogo.
58. As to the present state of the authorities on the question whether federal
courts can direct a verdict for the party having the burden of proof, see, 9 WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE (3d ed. I94o) §2495, In. 8; 3 MOORE, FEDERA. PRAcricE (1938) §5o.oi;
SuITH, The Flower of the Judge to Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of the New
York Civil Practice Act (r924) 24 COL. L. REv. iii, 118.
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sidered a subject of only academic interest here becomes of actual significance in deciding the content of an important constitutional right. Court
and counsel are called upon for exhaustive research in the sources of common law pleading and practice, not merely as antiquarians satisfying a
scholarly interest but as participants in deciding actual cases. Since the
Seventh Amendment has imposed the mortmain of the common law upon
procedures affecting trial by jury the interpretation of the Amendment
calls for skill of a high order in dealing with the source materials of history. Wisdom of a like order is also called for to determine which features of ancient practice are substance protected by the Amendment and
which are form excluded from its protection. What Maitland said of the
common law forms of action applies here with equal force to common law
pleading and practice. Though buried, "they still rule us from their
graves".59
James H. Chadbourn.
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